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In 2008, the citizens of California voted in favor of Proposition 2, which bans the use of
cages for housing egg-laying chickens.1 Similar propositions in Arizona (Proposition 204 in
November, 2006) and other states mandate stall-free and crate-free housing for sows and
calves for veal, respectively. Media advertising is used heavily in state-level propositions
because of the narrow focus of the issue, the geographic concentration of likely voters and
the (typically) highly polarized nature of the campaigns. There is evident support for this
issue among some consumers as cage-free eggs sell for a signi￿cant premium in retail stores
(sometimes $1.75 per dozen or more). What is less clear, however, is whether voting in
initiatives similar to Proposition 2 is driven by advertising-inspired mass-support of the issue
at hand, or whether it is highly motivated support by a small segment of the population that
cannot be in￿ uenced by advertising. In this study, we examine the role of media advertising
in the initiative process using an experimental analysis of ads used by both supporting and
opposing sides for Proposition 2 in California in November 2008.
Polling voters￿intentions is fraught with di¢ culties. Often, likely voters will tell the
pollster what they think the pollster wants to hear. Second, more important for the narrow
issues that are often the subject of public referenda, many voters simply do not care, or are
unaware of the issue (Rothschild, 1975). In the issue at hand, only a certain percentage of
the population are even egg consumers or animal lovers so the issue seems abstract, at best.
Third, voters sometimes lack a sense of consequentiality if they are asked their intent and
they are not actually in the voting booth so put little thought into their response. In this
study, we circumvent these problems by facing voters ￿consumers in this case ￿with real
economic incentives in an experimental environment to determine their willingness-to-pay
for cage-free eggs. Willingness-to-pay, while important from a food marketing perspective,
is also a valuable proxy for likely voting intentions and an accurate gauge of the importance
consumer-voters place on an issue. Ultimately, if a policy is a good one and "deserves" a
vote, it should be welfare-improving. Therefore, in this study we assess the value of political
advertising not on how many votes it generates, but on how it impacts the way the vote
should go, or how the ad a⁄ects economic welfare.
Animal welfare is an important issue in its own right, and has become increasingly promi-
nent as consumers become more conscious about what they eat, and where it came from.
Several studies suggest that consumers perceive products with animal-friendly attributes to
have a higher quality due to ethical beliefs, taste, food safety or health bene￿ts (Harper
and Makatouni, 2002; Ophuis, 1994; and Lusk et al., 2007).2 Regulating animal welfare,
however, presumes a market failure, but how does the market fail to adequately provide
for the well-being of animals used to produce our food? To the extent that the method
of production is a credence attribute ￿an attribute that can impact the individual agent￿ s
health, well-being or satisfaction with the product, but is not readily apparent in inspecting
or consuming the product ￿then the usual asymmetric-information arguments arise (Larue,
West, Gendron, and Lambert, 2002; Lusk, Fox, and Roosen, 2003; and Hartl and Herrmann,
2009). Alternatively, if we consider animals in general to be an appropriable resource similar
to water, minerals or lumber, then many believe that producing food according to commer-
1In July 2010, the governor signed follow-on legislation that banned the sale of caged eggs in California,
preventing the importation of eggs from other states that are produced in a way that is deemed inconsistent
with the principles laid out in Proposition 2.
2The issue has assumed a global dimension as initiatives similar to Proposition 2 in Canada have begun
to take shape on University campuses and among other animal-welfare interest groups (Potstra, 2008). Uzea
and Hobbs (2009), however, suggest that a subset of Canadian consumers has very high standards for animal
welfare and tend to drive legislation that risks "over-regulating" industry.
1cial methods imposes a negative production externality on society. Producing cage-free eggs
or stall-free pork are thus means of internalizing the negative externality. Advertising in
animal welfare ballot initiatives can therefore be interpreted as a means of convincing voters
to voluntarily self-impose a tax meant to address the externality problem, much like a tax
on fossil fuel is a means of reducing the costs imposed by greenhouse gas accumulation.
The welfare impacts of taxing egg-producers or imposing ine¢ cient production techniques
are critically dependent on whether advertising shifts the demand curve by changing prefer-
ences through "hype" (Dixit and Norman, 1978) or rotates the demand curve through the
provision of "real" information about the product and its alternatives (Nelson, 1970, 1974).
While the current orthodoxy in empirical advertising studies is to either assume advertising
only shifts the demand curve, or to interact advertising and prices to obtain some type of
ad-hoc measure of the rotational e⁄ect, we apply a new empirical approach to distinguish
between the two. If consumers are indeed heterogeneous in their preferences, then a demand
curve essentially represents a probability distribution of willingness to pay across consumers
that are highly knowledgeable and involved with the product, and those with only casual
knowledge of, and preference for, the product. This is the observation that lead Johnson
and Myatt (2006) to develop a formal model of how advertising, and other media activities,
really a⁄ects demand. We develop the model more completely below, but the intuition is
straightforward. If a product appeals to a "niche" market, or if the issue is of intense interest
to a concentrated group of voters, then advertisements that appeal to the core of this market
will increase the dispersion of consumers￿willingness to pay and rotate the demand curve
clockwise, increasing the willingness-to-pay of the marginal consumer whose willingness-to-
pay is above the mean and reducing it if the marginal consumer is below the mean. Reducing
the dispersion of demand means that the advertisement contains real information as it allows
consumers to sharpen their opinion of the product or, in this case, the issue. If a consumer
strongly prefers a product or side of an issue, then real information regarding that issue will
merely reinforce his or her position and move them away from the mean of all voters. If, on
the other hand, the issue is of interest to the mass market or all voters who have at least a
passing interest in the topic, then a successful ad will reduce the dispersion of demand and
rotate the demand curve counter-clockwise (make it more elastic). In this case, the ad will
increase the willingness-to-pay of the marginal consumer who begins with a valuation below
the mean.
In either case, if the "hype" content of the ad dominates, then the pure shift e⁄ect
dominates either rotation e⁄ect. If successful, exposure to the ad will change everyone￿ s
attitude to toward the issue and move the entire distribution of preferences in the direction
of either favoring or opposing the issue. Econometrically, the test is straightforward: if the
ad reduces the variance of willingness-to-pay, then it appeals to the di⁄use mass of voters
with casual interest, but if it increases the dispersion of willingness-to-pay then we conclude
that the ad appeals to a small, yet focused group of voters. If the dispersion does not change,
but preferences do, then the hype content is more important. Either way, we have a better
understanding of how political advertisements can be better crafted depending on the nature
of the issue at hand.
Our econometric model provides another way of testing for asymmetric e⁄ects of di⁄erent
types of information. Positive and negative information tend to have fundamentally di⁄er-
ent e⁄ects on consumer￿ s attitude toward a product or an issue. The same is likely true in
the case of political initiatives, where advertisement is inherently manipulative. Swartz and
Strand (1981) and Smith, van Ravensway and Thompson (1988) conduct empirical studies
of positive and negative information regarding contaminated food scares and ￿nd that the
initial, negative information has a far stronger e⁄ect in reducing demand than subsequent
positive information has in restoring demand. Similarly, Fox, Hayes and Shogren (2002)
use an experimental method similar to the one used here to ￿nd that negative information
regarding the potential health e⁄ects of irradiated pork greatly outweigh any positive infor-
mation. Strongly negative information e⁄ects can be explained by the loss-aversion theory of
Viscusi, Magat and Huber (1987) in which consumers are particularly sensitive to any nega-
tive variation in utility from the status quo. Losses are magni￿ed while gains are minimized.
2The Viscusi-Magat-Huber theory, however, is observationally equivalent in these situations
to the predictions of prospect theory developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Prospect
theory maintains that individuals assess losses and gains with respect to a reference point,
which in this case is their expectation that eggs are produced in uncontroversial ways. When
confronted with information that reality is somewhat worse than their expectations, they
magnify the negative result, while ignoring any information that may lead them to believe
that hens are more happy than they expect. Our experimental data, and the econometric
model used to test our hypotheses regarding willingness-to-pay are well-suited to examining
the issue of asymmetry and loss-aversion in the informative content of political ads.
This article makes a number of contributions to the policy and marketing literature. First,
we develop a new method of estimating the e⁄ect of marketing activities in an important,
yet little studied category of advertising expenditure: voter behavior in public referenda.
Second, our econometric model provides a way of separating the hype content of advertising
from its informative content. In doing so, we also o⁄er a new explanation for the observed
asymmetric e⁄ects of positive and negative information on consumers￿preferences. Third,
we propose and apply a metric against which policies may be judged as being either for or
against the public interest. The role of marketing in the formation of public policy is too
often overlooked, despite its obvious importance in the exercise of direct democracy.
Our research has three objectives. The ￿rst and primary objective of this study is to
determine the willingness-to-pay for food products raised in a ￿humane￿way, or one that
is fundamentally di⁄erent from current practice. The second objective is to determine the
relative e⁄ect on WTP of media advertising presented either in support of an animal welfare
initiative, or counter to it. The third objective is to determine whether media advertising
shifts or rotates the demand curve, and the welfare implications of whether the dominant
e⁄ect is a shift or a rotation. Ultimately, we seek a better understanding of the role of
campaign spending on matters that materially impact the ways in which ￿rms can conduct
themselves.
2 Research Method and Experimental Design
To determine the willingness-to-pay for cage-free eggs, we use a non-hypothetical experiment
in which we o⁄er subjects the opportunity to purchase eggs that are clearly labeled as cage-
free. Stated preference methods, such as surveys or choice experiments (conjoint analysis),
are often used to determine consumers￿willingness-to-pay for new food products (Lusk, et
al., 2001, for example). If the products do not currently exist, however, it is di¢ cult to
elicit ￿homegrown￿or personal values for these products as the buyers have no basis for
accurate comparison. Moreover, participants in stated choice data-gathering exercises have
no real incentive to reveal their true demand as they have no economic stake in the outcome
of the survey. List and Gallet (2001) ￿nd that respondents state values 2-20% greater in
hypothetical questions relative to non-hypothetical valuation questions. A non-hypothetical
experiment, on the other hand, has the ability to uncover consumers￿true willingness-to-
pay because participants in the experiment are provided real economic incentives to make
decisions that provide the most bene￿t at the lowest possible cost. Consequently, we conduct
a non-hypothetical experiment in which we use real economic incentives to elicit consumers￿
willingness to pay for cage-free eggs. Because these attributes are not apparent by inspecting
the goods themselves in the absence of labels to that e⁄ect, we are essentially obtaining likely
market prices for what are termed ￿credence￿attributes, or attributes that the consumer
must trust the producer to include in the product.
Speci￿cally, we use a Becker-deGroot-Marschak (1964, BDM) auction mechanism to de-
termine willingness-to-pay. Using a BDM mechanism is intended to ensure truthful value
elicitation while minimizing the possibility that we exclude marginal bidders (those who are
likely to have a low value for cage-free eggs) from the auction. The BDM auction works as
follows. All subjects are initially endowed with a regular-size candy bar and a dozen regular
3(non-cage-free) eggs. In each round (and in the practice round), subjects were asked to
submit their willingness-to-pay to upgrade to either a king-size candy bar (practice round)
or cage-free eggs (actual auction). The experimenter then draws a price at random from a
uniform distribution between zero and the maximum willingness-to-pay submitted. All bid-
ders willing to pay equal to or more than this random price receive the upgrade, while those
below the random price do not. The ￿market price￿in the auction is the random price. The
BDM mechanism is demand revealing because the bidder does not know what the market
price will be, but does understand that every price between zero and the maximum bid has
an equal probability of becoming the market price. Therefore, if he or she were to shade
their bid in order to save money, they may lose an item they value and if they bid above
their true value, they risk buying something for more money than it is worth.
In this way, the results of our research may be used to inform policymakers as to the true
economic cost of the propositions, the distributional e⁄ects of regulating production prac-
tices, and to inform marketing managers in egg marketing ￿rms as to how they should price
and promote new food products to maximum advantage. More importantly, the empirical
model described in the next section is able to determine whether media advertising of either
type ￿shifts￿the demand curve for cage-free eggs or rotates it. This distinction is important
both in the calculation of welfare outcomes, and in determining the nature of the advertising
e⁄ect: whether it provides information to consumers / voters, causing the demand curve to
become more elastic (Norman, 1970, 1974), or whether it is inherently persuasive, changing
tastes and causing demand to become less elastic (Dixit and Norman, 1978).
3 Empirical Model of Media Advertising
We test for shift or rotation e⁄ects of media advertising using an empirical model that cap-
tures the theoretical e⁄ects of advertising described by Johnson and Myatt (2006). Concep-
tually, the information content of advertising is di¢ cult to separate from what may otherwise
be described as "hype." While the historical debate centers on whether advertising changes
preferences (Dixit and Norman, 1978), provides information (Norman, 1974) or provides a
complementary good to the product being purchased (Becker and Murphy, 1983), Johnson
and Myatt (2006) develop a general theory of demand that relies on none of these behavioral
assumptions. Rather, Johnson and Myatt (2006) develop a fundamentally new perspective
on how advertising works. Rather than simply shift demand, advertising in their model op-
erates on the dispersion of consumer valuations for the product. If advertising provides ￿real
information,￿in their terminology, then the dispersion of valuations for the product is likely
to rise. Consumers who value the product relatively highly before the advertisement will like
it even more after the ad, and those who value it less highly will like it even less. Demand
rotates clockwise. For ￿rms that sell a homogeneous product, designed to sell to the mass-
market, this rotation in demand reduces the valuation of the marginal consumer, reducing
pro￿ts. In this case, the marginal consumer is ￿below average￿in terms of his willingness
to pay for the product. Firms that sell highly di⁄erentiated products, designed to appeal
to a niche market, however, prefer advertisements that rotate demand in this way because
their marginal consumer is ￿above average.￿The willingness to pay for this consumer rises
with a clockwise rotation in demand. Firms that sell homogenous goods, therefore, prefer
to use advertising that is ￿pure hype￿as it shifts demand outward at each price. These
￿rms would rather minimize the dispersion of valuations and thus rotate the demand curve
counter-clockwise, raising the valuation of their marginal consumer and, hence, pro￿ts.
The analogy to political ads is straightforward. Polarizing issues that tend to have both
passionate supporters and equally passionate detractors are "highly di⁄erentiated products,"
while more mundane issues that are not likely to inspire as much controversy are more akin
to "homogeneous products." Same-sex marriage is an example of the former, while bond
issues for local sports stadiums are good examples of the latter. The marginal voter in a
polarizing campaign is likely to have a valuation greater than the mean, so ads that provide
4real information are likely to increase the dispersion of demand, rotate the demand curve
clockwise, increase the valuation of the marginal voter, and raise the "total take" on voting
day. On the other hand, real information in a run-of-the-mill campaign is expected to reduce
the dispersion of demand, essentially moving voters to the center of the issue, rotating the
demand curve counter-clockwise, and increasing the willingness-to-pay of the marginal voter
who began with a valuation that is below the mean.
Formally, consider the de￿nition of a rotation in the demand curve described by Johnson
and Myatt (2006). Assume there is a unit mass of consumers, each willing to pay w for one
unit of the item in question. The distribution of w is represented by Fs(w), which is twice
continuously di⁄erentiable in both s and w with density fs(w). The parameter s governs the
shape of the distribution of valuations such that an increase in s represents a spread in the
density of w and, hence a clockwise rotation of Fs(w) about some point
^
w (￿gure 1, Johnson
and Myatt, 2006). We next derive the e⁄ect of a spread in valuations on the distribution
of market demand. At any price, p, the proportion of consumers who purchase the good
is given by: q = 1 ￿ Fs(p). Inverting this expression gives an expression for the inverse
demand curve: Ps(q) = F ￿1
s (1 ￿ q), so a change in s rotates the inverse demand curve in
a manner analogous to the change in the distribution of valuations (￿gure 2, Johnson and
Myatt, 2006). Namely, if demand is below the pivot point,
^
q, then an increase in the spread












Equation (1) implies that if we are below the pivot-point in demand, greater dispersion in
valuations causes the valuation of the marginal consumer, and hence the market price, to
rise and if we are above the pivot-point in demand, an increase in the dispersion of demand
causes the price to fall. In the former case, the issue with the product is more likely to be
of interest to a concentrated special interest, or niche group of voters, and in the latter the
issue is likely to be of interest to the mass of voters.
We use the theoretical framework developed in this model to derive a structural model
of pro- and anti-animal welfare regulation advertising. Our model is structural in the sense
that it is derived directly from the utility-theoretic model of advertising hype versus real
information. We derive the willingness to pay (WTP) for cage-free eggs in a random utility
framework in which the distribution of consumer heterogeneity re￿ ects the distribution of
marginal valuations in the theoretical model above. In the random utility model, consumer
utility is the sum of a deterministic and stochastic part such that:
Uij = Vij + "ij; (2)
for product j by consumer i, where Vij is the deterministic component of utility, and "ij
is an iid error term. Utility, in turn, is a function of attributes of the chooser (xi) and of
the choice (zj), a vector of advertising exposures (ak) and income (yi). The marginal value
consumer i places on product j = 1 is de￿ned as the amount of income that leaves his or her
utility at least as great with and without the purchase:
Vi0(z0;a0;xi;yi) + "i0 ￿ Vi1(z1;a1;xi;yi ￿ ci1) + "i1; (3)
where ci1 is the marginal value of product 1 by consumer i . We solve for the willingness to
pay by consumer i by invoking the random utility assumption and recognizing that:
Pr(WTPi1 ￿ ci1) = Pr(Vi0 + "i0 ￿ Vi1 + "i1); (4)
Assuming the error term is double-exponential distributed with mean 0 and variance ￿2￿2=3,
the willingness to pay becomes:




where ￿ is the logit scale parameter. Solving for the willingness to pay from this expression,
we write the odds ratio of choosing product 1 relative to product 0 as:
Pr(j = 1)





where we normalize exp(Vi0=￿) to one and Pr(j = 1) is the probability of purchasing good
1. Taking logs of both sides of the odds ratio gives an expression for the willingness to pay
by consumer i as a function of choice and chooser attributes, the level of advertising and





1 ￿ Pr(j = 1)
￿
= WTPi1 = Vi1=￿: (7)
With an appropriate speci￿cation for Vi1 it is possible to test for both the direct e⁄ect of
pro- and anti-animal welfare advertising on the willingness to pay for cage-free eggs, and the
indirect e⁄ect through the dispersion of valuations.
Utility in a random utility framework is typically additive over attribute arguments.
Writing Vi1 in terms of an empirical, or estimable, model of utility, we assume that:









￿mamj + ￿j; (8)
where ￿j is a choice-speci￿c constant, ￿k are marginal values for each product attribute,
￿l represent the in￿ uence of each demographic attribute on willingness to pay, ￿m is the
impact of advertising of type m (pro- or anti-animal welfare) on indirect utility and ￿j is
the iid econometric error term. Advertising, however, is hypothesized to have both a direct
e⁄ect through creating hype and shifting the demand curve, and an indirect e⁄ect through
the dispersion of valuations. We model this latter e⁄ect by recognizing the that advertising
response term is a function of unobserved consumer heterogeneity through the distribution of
preferences, Fs above. Each advertising-impact parameter is randomly distributed according
to:
￿m = ￿m0 + ￿m1￿m + ￿m; ￿m ￿ N(0;1); (9)
where ￿m0 is now interpreted as the direct e⁄ect of advertising of type m (shift e⁄ect), ￿m1 is
the indirect, or rotational e⁄ect caused by changes in the dispersion of valuations, and ￿mj
is the variability in tastes associated with each type of ad. Substituting this utility model
into the expression for WTPi1 provides an estimable model of the impact of advertising on
the willingness to pay under each type of advertising. Table 1 summarizes the hypotheses
we test with this model.
[table 1 in here]
4 Results and Discussion Summary
Our results show that the "hype" or shift e⁄ect dominates the rotation e⁄ect for each type
of ad. Moreover, the persuasiveness of the ads supporting Proposition 2 were su¢ ciently
e⁄ective in changing preferences to outweigh the negative e⁄ects associated with the opposing
ads. Because the notion that animals may be mistreated in the production of food comes
6as a revelation to many consumers (who are also voters), this result can be explained by
Kahneman and Tversky￿ s (1979) prospect theory. Framed by the assumption that all farm
animals are happy, the ads supporting Proposition 2 revealed sometimes shocking images
of animals being mistreated and caused consumers to perceive a measure of risk to animal
welfare that they didn￿ t fully appreciate before the campaign. This small amount of "bad
news" regarding animal welfare was enough to outweigh many strong, but conventional
economic arguments, on the other side.
The real information content of the ads was not inconsequential. Perhaps because the
supportive ads revealed information that was not previously known to many voters, and
participants in our study, the rotation e⁄ect for the "Pro" ads was nearly three times the
strength of the rotation e⁄ect for "Anti" ads. Using measures of consumer welfare to convert
our econometric estimates to a dollar-measure, we found that over 6% of the change in
consumer welfare associated with the ads came from the real information e⁄ect as opposed
to the hype e⁄ect. Therefore, the ads both changed preferences and managed to harden
some voters￿opinions on either side.
Politics has become as much about marketing as it is about political science or public
administration. As Johnson and Myatt (2006) point out, all advertising consists of varying
amounts of real information and hype. With the method used here, we sort out how much
of each lies in each ad. Our insights thus generalize beyond the animal welfare case to any
type of advertising program in which advertising is neither purely informative nor purely
persuasive. Staying in the public policy realm, "issue ads" are now the order of the day
given the unrestricted amounts interested parties can contribute to political campaigns.
Issue ads are often even more partisan than state-level ballots so this method could be use
to evaluate how voters perceive the message contained in the ads ￿do they understand the
true motivations of the money behind the ad? From another perspective, tools like this can
help ad agencies design political ads to maximize the e⁄ectiveness of ad spending. If an
issue is particularly misunderstood among the electorate, then designing an ad with a high
real information content may be able to skew the distribution of preferences such that the
"willingness to pay" for the issue at hand rises signi￿cantly.
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Table 1: Hypotheses for Advertising E⁄ect
Hypothesis Parameters Expectation
1. "Pro" advertising increases WTP ￿10 > 0 "Pro" ads are pure hype and shift
for all voters demand curve out for all voters
2. "Pro" advertising increases the ￿11 > ￿01 "Pro" ads have real information
dispersion of preferences and rotate demand clockwise
3. "Anti" advertising increases WTP ￿20 > 0 "Anti" ads are pure hype and shift
for all voters demand curve out for all voters
4. "Anti" advertising increases the ￿21 > ￿01 "Anti" ads have real information
dispersion of preferences and rotate demand clockwise
5. "Pro/Anti" advertising increases ￿30 > 0 "Pro/Anti" ads are pure hype and
WTP for all voters shift demand curve out for all voters
6. "Pro/Anti" advertising increases ￿31 > ￿01 "Pro/Anti" ads have real information
the dispersion of preferences and rotate demand clockwise
Note: ￿00 and ￿01 are constant shift and rotation terms, respectively. Index m=1 refers to "Anti" ads,
index m=2 refers to "Pro" ads and m=3 refers to "Pro/Anti" ads.
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